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For years, phenomenological psychiatry has proposed that distortions of the temporal
structure of consciousness contribute to the abnormal experiences described before
schizophrenia emerges, and may relate to basic disturbances in consciousness of the
self. However, considering that temporality refers mainly to an implicit aspect of our
relationship with the world, disturbances in the temporal structure of consciousness
remain difficult to access. Nonetheless, previous studies have shown a correlation
between self disorders and the automatic ability to expect an event in time, suggesting
timing is a key issue for the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Timing disorders
may represent a target for cognitive remediation, but this requires that disorders can
be demonstrated at an individual level. Since cognitive impairments in patients with
schizophrenia are discrete, and there is no standardized timing exploration, we focused
on timing impairments suggested to be related to self disorders. We present the case
report of AF, a 22 year old man suffering from schizophrenia, with no antipsychotic
intake. Although AF shows few positive and negative symptoms and has a normal
neurocognitive assessment, he shows a high level of disturbance of Minimal Self
Disorders (SDs) (assessed with the EASE scale). Moreover, AF has a rare ability to
describe his self and time difficulties. An objective assessment of timing ability (variable
foreperiod task) confirmed that AF had temporal impairments similar to those previously
described in patients, i.e., a preserved ability to distinguish time intervals, but a difficulty
to benefit from the passage of time to expect a visual stimulus. He presents additional
difficulties in benefitting from temporal cues and adapting to changes in time delays. The
impairments were ample enough to yield significant effects with analyses at the individual
level. Although causal relationships between subjective and objective impairments
cannot be established, the results show that exploring timing deficits at the individual
level is possible in patients with schizophrenia. Besides, the results are consistent with
hypotheses relating minimal self disorders (SDs) to timing difficulties. They suggest that
both subjective and objective timing investigations should be developed further so that
their use at an individual level can be generalized in clinical practice.
Keywords: self disorders, schizophrenia, timing and time perception, minimal self, hazard function, simultaneity
judgment, implicit
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INTRODUCTION
Psychiatrists in the field of both phenomenology and
experimental psychology have proposed that disturbances
of temporality in schizophrenia represent a key issue for
psychopathology (Fuchs, 2007; Vogeley and Kupke, 2007).
Timing disorders may relate especially to basic disturbances
in consciousness of the self i.e., the “minimal self ” (Martin
et al., 2014; Giersch and Mishara, 2017a). The minimal self is
defined by the pre-reflexive “mineness” of conscious experience
(Gallagher, 2000). For example, we say “I see a tree” when
pointing out a tree to another person. In this sentence, the
subject says “I” without thinking about it, as a result of his/her
natural first-person perspective. The presence of the “I” signals
the sense of “minimal self.” As explained by Stanghellini (2009)
“I experience myself as the perspectival origin of my experiences
(i.e., perceptions or emotions), actions and thoughts.” Minimal
Self disorders (SDs) are considered as trait markers. They
have been described in prodromal, as well as chronic stages of
schizophrenia (Møller and Husby, 2000; Parnas et al., 2003, 2005;
Raballo et al., 2011). They are considered stable, core features
of schizophrenia (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2010; Gallese and Ferri,
2013; Nelson et al., 2013b; Hur et al., 2014; Mishara et al.,
2014; Nordgaard and Parnas, 2014; Nordgaard et al., 2017), and
discriminate the schizophrenia spectrum from bipolar disorders
with psychotic experiences and other psychoses (Haug et al.,
2012a), or borderline personality (Nelson et al., 2013a). However,
descriptions of temporality disorders are rarer. Temporality
is the sense of continuity that is inherent to the concept of
minimal self: we implicitly think of ourselves as unique beings
that are continuous in time. Our sense of self continuity is a
given, which we do not naturally question. It is so strong a
feeling that it is difficult to imagine its perturbation, making it
difficult to access by verbal report. Timing disorders are thus
often ignored in clinical settings, despite their potential role
in pathophysiology. They have however been demonstrated in
group studies, and have been related to minimal self disorders
(Martin et al., 2017). Here we check whether it is possible to
demonstrate timing disorders at an individual level, which is
a critical step toward the integration of such evaluations into
clinical practice.
We present a case report of AF because he has the rare
ability to describe his time and self disorders (“subjective”
timing). We also report experimental results (“objective” timing)
analyzed at the single case level in AF, focusing on temporal
expectation in the seconds time-range. Complementary results
on a simultaneity judgement task in the millisecond range
(Martin et al., 2014; Giersch and Mishara, 2017a,b), can
be found in Supplementary Materials. We explored implicit
timing, which is defined by the processing of information in
time independently of any explicit temporal judgement (Coull
and Nobre, 2008). This type of timing is very close to the
phenomenological description of human time in that it shapes
conscious experience rather than representing the contents
of time. We favor this approach because explicit duration
judgements are characterized by variability rather than a clear
over- or underestimation (Thoenes and Oberfeld, 2017), can
be affected by attention or working memory impairments
(e.g., Campbell and Davalos, 2015), and hence are difficult
to interpret at an individual level (see Giersch and Mishara,
2017b, for a discussion on implicit vs. explicit measures in
schizophrenia).
The temporal expectation task explores the ability to
continuously extract temporally predictive information from the
elapse of time, i.e., to benefit from the predictive information
inherent in the unidirectional flow of time. A disconnection from
time’s flow would mean a lack of immersion in the world, which
should impact the patient’s ability to feel present and embodied in
his actions, feelings and thoughts. The observation of both types
of impairment in this patient would reinforce the hypothesis of a
link between implicit timing and the sense of self.
AF Case Report
Anamnesis and Symptomatology
AF is a 25-year-old man, who has never worked since his
professional training in electronics. He attends a rehabilitation
center because of social and professional difficulties. He has been
followed psychiatrically for 4 years, following a suicide attempt
and a diagnosis of schizophrenia. When we met him, he had no
more psychiatric support and no treatment. A written informed
consent was obtained from AF for the publication of this case
report.
AF was born in Lyon (France). He was adopted at
the age of 2 years. His childhood contained no great
peculiarities, though he describes himself as “shy” since
childhood. He has always been imbued with the diffuse
feeling of “being different.” During childhood, he was a
good pupil. The family atmosphere was serene. However, a
state of psychic suffering gradually settled in during early
adulthood. It was marked by a difficulty in maintaining good
school performance (“everything required more and more
effort... maybe I became too analytical”). AF also describes
growing difficulty in interacting with others “I gradually
became isolated... It is as if contact with others was not
natural anymore...I began to wonder how others behaved so
naturally.” AF adds: “Everything was a question for me...
stupid questions like ‘why does the mouth go upwards
when you smile’.” He gradually quit school, became isolated
and withdrew to the family home. At the age of 18, he
attempted suicide “As amazing as it may seem... I could
no longer stand to always be thinking about everything.”
He was then hospitalized for 3 months in a psychiatric
ward for a delirious state, marked by ideas of persecution.
Antipsychotic drugs (risperidone and then olanzapine) were
then prescribed and the diagnosis of schizophrenic disorder was
made on the presence of delusions, negative symptoms, major
impairments in interpersonal functioning, and lack of evidence
for schizoaffective disorder and autism.
When we encountered AF, functional impairments persisted,
i.e., difficulty in social and professional integration, but there was
no longer any obvious behavioral symptomatology (see clinical
details in Supplementary Material). The patient voiced twomajor
complaints. The first concerned the feeling of being oneself, and
the second his experience of time.
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Lack of Ownership—Minimal Self Disorder (SDs)
On several occasions, AF reported feelings of being at a distance
from his environment and his own sensation of being a subject.
“I often observemyself from the outside... When I’m speaking,
I’m seeing myself speaking at the same time that I’m speaking...
when I’m walking, it is as if I am controlling myself artificially
at the same time that I am walking... as if I were outside myself,
and it is not really I who perceive... as if my perception is bland,
artificial... as if I am not there....”
In addition, AF described a loss of natural evidence, associated
with an experience of hyper-reflexivity. “Everything raises
questions... it is as if the world would be so far from me that
everything is questionable... why is the table called a table... why
is the sky blue... why do I have two arms and not three.”
Finally, AF described: “it is as if the content of my perception
is wrong... as if there is me on one side, and an artificial
environment on the other side that reflects my perception... as
if what I perceive is not really what is there to be perceived.... I
sometimes have the impression that it is cut in two parts...or that
I’m alone, without a real perception.”
AF’s bodily feelings, and relationships to his own thoughts
were also disturbed, and descriptions can be found in
Supplementary Materials.
Disturbance of Temporality
Timing disturbances are usually difficult to explore, but come
up frequently in AF’s complaints: “I do not feel the time,” “The
word ‘time’ has no meaning for me...[I have to] use tools, tricks,
to know that time has passed.” “For example, I often look at
my watch to know that time elapsed...” “You see, I can use a
metaphor to explain to you... Birds, they have a sense that allows
them to orient themselves... a kind of magnetism... It is an innate
thing... If they do not have it, they cannot navigate... Me, it’s
the time I do not have... I’m like blind to time... but I cannot
explain it better... I try to find out how to talk about it... but I
can’t manage to explain. . . It may be the most important thing to
understand...”
Although time is his main complaint, AF is unable to better
specify the particularity of his relationship to time.
OTHER INVESTIGATIONS—MATERIALS
AND METHODS
EASE Scale
The EASE is a 57 item semi-structured interview designed to
explore SDs. The scale was administered by BM, who was trained
in its use by one of the authors of the EASE scale (JP). Five
domains are explored, as detailed in Supplementary Materials.
AF had a total score of 16, which corresponds to a score
frequently found in the population of people with schizophrenia.
Detailed sub-scores can be found in Supplementary Material.
Neuro Cognition
A neurocognitive assessment was performed by a
neuropsychologist, including psychomotor speed, working
memory, verbal memory and executive functions. No major
TABLE 1 | Scores of AF in the neurocognitive battery.
ATTENTIONAL FUNCTIONING (D2) (Brickenkamp, 2002)
KL (concentration) 184 (RP 57,9)
GZ (speed) 445 (RP 30,9)
FLEXIBILITY (TMT) (Tombaugh, 2004)
TMT A (speed) 32 (DS−0,9)
TMT B (flexibility) 96 (DS= −3,7)*
TMT A – B 64 (DS = −1,7)*
Short term memory (forward digit span – WAIS 4) 7 (DS = +0,4)
Working memory (backward digit span – WAIS 4) 6 (DS = +1)
VERBAL LONG TERM MEMORY (FREE AN CUED SELECTIVE REMINDING
TEST—RL/RI-16) (Grober and Buschke, 1987)
Immediate recall 16 (RP 50)
Free recall 1 14 (DS +1,5)
Free recall 2 14 (DS = +1,5)
Free recall 3 16 (DS +0,7)
Delayed Free recall 15 (DS +0,16)
Total recall 1 16 (RP 75)
Total recall 2 16 (RP 50)
Total recall 3 16 (RP 25)
Total delayed recal 16 (RP 25)
MULTIPLE ERRANDS TEST (MET) (Shallice and Burgess, 1991)
Total number of errors 2 (RP 50)
Verbal reasoning 27 (NS = 14)
The battery was designed to explore the main cognitive functions known to be impaired
in patients with schizophrenia (Heinrichs and Zakzanis, 1998), and known to affect explicit
duration estimation in these patients (Bonnot et al., 2011; Roy et al., 2012; Ward et al.,
2012; Campbell and Davalos, 2015; de Montalembert et al., 2016). It is to be noted that
the patient did not display thymic disorders (see Supplementary Material for details).
deficit was observed, except a flexibility deficit. Scores are
detailed in Table 1.
Temporal Prediction Task
A visual target was displayed at various intervals after an initial
fixation point (400 or 1,000ms), and the task was to press
a response key as quickly as possible once the target was
displayed. The conditional probability of target presentation
increases with the length of the interval (termed the “hazard
function”), resulting in a heightening sense of expectation over
time. Increasing expectation results in shorter reaction times
(RTs) as the delay between fixation point and target increases
(Niemi and Näätänen, 1981). This decrease in RT is referred to
as the variable foreperiod effect.
To investigate the patient’s ability to implicitly take such
conditional probabilities into account, he performed the task in
two different types of experimental blocks. In one set of blocks,
the initial fixation point was not followed by the target in 25%
of trials (25% catch trials) whereas in the other blocks the target
always followed the fixation point (0% catch trials). Catch trials
decrease the expectancy that the target will be presented and lead
to “dispreparation,” yielding a decrease in the variable foreperiod
effect.
We also investigated the ability to voluntarily orient attention
in time. In half of the blocks, we used visual cues to indicate
the time of occurrence of the target, either 400 or 1,000ms
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the conditions used in the temporal orienting task. After the initial central fixation point (on the left in each quadrant), the target was displayed
left or right of screen center (on the right in each quadrant) and subjects had to press a response key corresponding to the side of target presentation as quickly and
accurately as possible. The fixation point comprised a cue indicating the delay between fixation and target (400 or 1,000ms, “temporal condition,” two left quadrants)
or not (“neutral condition,” two right quadrants). In addition the target was either always displayed after the fixation point (0% catch trials, 2 upper quadrants) or was
absent in 25% of the cases (25% catch trials, 2 lower quadrants).
after the fixation point (Figure 1). This temporal cue condition
was contrasted with a neutral cue condition (which provided no
temporal information).
All experimental conditions were crossed orthogonally
(Figure 1). A detailed description is provided in Supplementary
Materials.
To further explore the implicit processing of time intervals
we analyzed trial-to-trial sequential effects in blocks with 0%
catch trials (Los and van den Heuvel, 2001). These effects rely
on automatic mechanisms (Vallesi et al., 2014), whereby the
time interval of the preceding trial influences performance on
the current trial: if the foreperiod on trial N is shorter than
that on trial N-1, reaction times are slowed. However, no such
effect is observed when the foreperiod is longer on trial N than
N-1.
The temporal orienting test has been used widely (Coull and
Nobre, 1998; Correa et al., 2006; Nobre and van Ede, 2018) and
participants matched to AF on age and education level showed
typical results on this test: RTs were faster for temporal vs. neutral
cue conditions and, in the neutral condition, for long vs. short
foreperiods (Martin et al., 2017).
RESULTS—TEMPORAL PREDICTION TASK
AF committed only 3.3% errors, which were not analyzed further.
Analyses of variance were conducted on RTs for correct trials,
with each RT as a random variable. In the first analysis we
included cue type (temporal vs. neutral), catch-trial percentage
(0% vs. 25%), and foreperiod (400 vs. 1,000ms) as between-
group variables. Results showed a significant interaction between
foreperiod and catch-trial percentage [F(1, 752) = 6.5, p< 0.05).
Post-hoc Tukey analysis showed that in case of 0% catch trials
there was no difference in RTs between 400ms (323ms) and
1,000ms (321ms), whereas in the case of 25% catch trials,
RTs increased between 400ms (333ms) and 1,000ms (357ms),
p<.05. There was also a main effect of cue type [F(1, 752) =
13.8, p < 0.001]. RTs were longer for temporal (340ms) than for
neutral cues (321ms) (Figure 2).
In a second analysis, we analyzed sequential effects during
neutral cue 0% catch trial blocks only. Results showed that RTs
were longer when the foreperiod of two consecutive trials were
different rather than identical [337 vs. 307ms, F(1, 444) = 21.4,
p < 0.001]. This effect was significant both when the foreperiod
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FIGURE 2 | Mean Reaction times for AF as a function of catch-trial condition (0% catch trials in the lefthand graph, vs. 25% catch trials in the righthand graph),
foreperiod between cue and target (400 vs. 1,000ms, on the X axis), and cue type (temporal in red and neutral in blue).
FIGURE 3 | Mean Reaction times for AF on trial N as a function of foreperiod duration on trial N (400/1,000ms) and of sequence type: foreperiods were either different
(red) or identical (blue) in trials N and N-1.
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was 400ms on trial N [342 vs. 305ms, F(1, 224) = 18.9, p< 0.001],
and when it was 1,000ms [333 vs. 311ms, F(1, 221)= 5.4, p< 0.05]
(Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
The case of AF is characterized by low intensity schizophrenia
symptoms. In particular, AF shows no delusion or
disorganization of thought. However, AF presents significant
subjective complaints that can be attributed to SDs. A normal
sense of self involves automatic, not-reflexive, self presence,
and immersion in the world (Parnas et al., 2005). We perceive
and act in the world “from the inside.” Because our thinking is
“glued” to ourselves, our consciousness is non-spatial in nature
and we cannot locate our consciousness, our thoughts, which are
intuitively experienced as ours.
In contrast, AF describes experiences reflecting a distance
from his own perception and self-awareness, i.e., a lack of
immersion in the world. His own consciousness of himself, as
well as his own perceptions, no longer seem embodied by the self
and appear to him as mechanical and distinct from himself. In
addition, the patient presents a loss of natural evidence, and a loss
of immersion in his environment (Parnas et al., 2005). Finally,
AF’s descriptions of a “perceptualization of inner discourse”
and “spatialization of thought” (see Supplementary Material)
suggest that there is a gap between his thoughts and the self,
reflecting and/or leading to the loss of the “mineness” of mental
experience.
Taken together, these disturbances reflect a basic alteration
of the feeling of presence, i.e., immersion in the world, which
represents a fundamental feature of SDs. AF’s disturbances are
attested by his high score on the EASE scale.
AF had a normal neuro-cognitive assessment, despite his
minimal self disturbances being quite large. This dissociation
between normal neurocognitive outcome and SDs is consistent
with the literature (Haug et al., 2012b), which does not indicate
a correlation between typical neuro-cognitive disturbances and
minimal SDs.
Usual neuro-cognitive batteries are not exhaustive though,
and AF insists that he does not “have a sense of time.” AF also
insists on his great difficulty in being able to describe more
precisely the peculiarities of his time experience.
AF Shows Several Timing Impairments
AF does not benefit from the flow of time to optimize
his temporal expectancies, i.e., his reaction time does not
decrease as the probability of target occurrence increases. In
addition, in the presence of catch trials, there is a large
dispreparation effect (Correa et al., 2006) resulting in slower
RTs at 1,000ms than at 400ms. These results are consistent
with those observed at the group level (Martin et al., 2017),
especially in patients with SDs. As in this previous study,
our results suggest a fragility in the ability to make temporal
predictions. Moreover, results fit with AF’s complaint that he
does not feel that time has elapsed. Despite these difficulties,
some basic ability to encode time intervals is preserved, as
shown by the fact that, as in healthy participants, RTs increase
when the foreperiod between consecutive trials differs. This
result shows that the difference between 400 and 1,000ms
has been encoded. This is not surprising, since automatic
coding of short durations has been found in electrophysiological
studies of cortical slices, i.e., without requiring the entire
cortex (Goel and Buonomano, 2016). In AF, it is not interval
estimation that is impaired, but the ability to use this interval
to predict the probability of target occurrence. It is also to
be noted that AF had no difficulty in taking probabilities
into account, since performance changed when the probability
of target presentation was manipulated, i.e., in the case of
catch trials. It is thus the temporal prediction itself that seems
affected.
However, some of AF’s results had not been observed at the
group level. Sequential effects were preserved in our group of
patients with schizophrenia (see Supplementary Material). For
AF, performance was similarly affected whether the foreperiod
on trial N was shorter or longer than that on trial N-1. It’s
as if AF expected the foreperiod to be strictly identical on
consecutive trials and was unable to reinitialize expectation once
the target had not been displayed after the short foreperiod. This
effect is reminiscent of previous studies suggesting heightened
sequential effects in patients (Zahn et al., 1963). Together with
AF’s difficulty in using temporal cues (unusually, RTs were slower,
rather than faster, after temporal cues), the results suggest that
temporal prediction is especially fragile and lacks flexibility in this
patient.
Overall, AF’s complaints about time were supported by
objective exploration. The paucity of other symptoms and neuro-
cognitive impairmentmakes it tempting to propose a relationship
between objective and/or subjective timing difficulties and
minimal SDs, consistent with previous hypotheses (Martin
et al., 2014, 2017; Giersch and Mishara, 2017a,b). However,
such a relationship cannot be proven, and more extensive
exploration of timing might be useful, e.g. using longer time
intervals. Yet, the important result in the present study is that
timing disorders can be demonstrated at an individual level,
independent of antipsychotics or impairments in attention and
memory. This is the first step toward personalized evaluation
and therapeutics. We suggest that subjective and objective
explorations of timing may usefully complete patients’ clinical
evaluation.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The project was approved by a local ethics committee
(CPP Sud Est VI), and informed written consent was
obtained, before the study, from each patient and
control participant. All methods have been conducted in
accordance with the recommendation of the Declaration of
Helsinki.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
AG and JC: designed the study; BM and NF: provided
their clinical expertise and acquired the experimental and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 132
Martin et al. Self and Timing in Schizophrenia
clinical data; BM: conducted the clinical interviews; BM and
MC: scored the EASE; AG: analyzed the experimental data;
AG, JC, and BM: interpreted the data; BM: wrote the first
draft of the manuscript; AG and JC: edited and finalized the
manuscript. All authors reviewed, amended, and approved the
manuscript.
FUNDING
The research was funded by INSERM, and a grant from the
Conseil Scientifique de la recherche de l’Hôpital le Vinatier
(CSR F05, AO2014) and an ANR grant (Autotime, ANR-16-
CE37-0004).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Zelda Prost for her help with neuro-cognitive
assessment. INSERM, the University Hospital of Strasbourg and
of Lyon (Le Vinatier) provided logistical support for this research,
as well as a grant from the Conseil Scientifique de la recherche
de l’Hôpital le Vinatier (CSR F05, AO2014) and an ANR grant
(Autotime, ANR-16-CE37-0004).
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.
2018.00132/full#supplementary-material
REFERENCES
Bonnot, O., de Montalembert, M., Kermarrec, S., Botbol, M., Walter,
M., and Coulon, N. (2011). Are impairments of time perception in
schizophrenia a neglected phenomenon? J. Physiol. Paris 105, 164–169.
doi: 10.1016/j.jphysparis.2011.07.006
Brickenkamp, R. (2002). Test d2. Aufmerksamkeits-Belastungs-Test (9th Edn). The
d2 test. Test of Attention Under Pressure. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Campbell, A. M., and Davalos, D. B. (2015). Levels of attention and task difficulty
in the modulation of interval duration mismatch negativity. Front. Psychol.
6:1619. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01619
Correa, A., Lupiáñez, J., and Tudela, P. (2006). The attentional mechanism of
temporal orienting: determinants and attributes. Exp. Brain Res. 169, 58-68.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-005-0131-x
Coull, J. T., and Nobre, A. C. (1998). Where and when to pay attention: the neural
systems for directing attention to spatial locations and to time intervals as
revealed by both PET and fMRI. J. Neurosci. 18, 7426–7435.
Coull, J. T., and Nobre, K. (2008). Dissociating explicit timing from
temporal expectation with fMRI. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 18, 137–144.
doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2008.07.011
de Montalembert, M., Coulon, N., Cohen, D., Bonnot, O., and Tordjman, S.
(2016). Time perception of simultaneous and sequential events in early-onset
schizophrenia. Neurocase 22, 392–399. doi: 10.1080/13554794.2016.1205098
Fuchs, T. (2007). The temporal structure of intentionality and its disturbance in
schizophrenia. Psychopathology 40, 229-235. doi: 10.1159/000101365
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self:
implications for cognitive science. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 14-21.
doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01417-5
Gallese, V., and Ferri, F. (2013). Jaspers, the body, and schizophrenia: the bodily
self. Psychopathology 46, 330-336. doi: 10.1159/000353258
Giersch, A., and Mishara, A. L. (2017a). Disrupted continuity of subjective time in
the milliseconds range in the self-disturbances of schizophrenia: convergence
of experimental, phenomenological and predictive coding accounts. J. Consc.
Studies 24, 62–87.
Giersch, A., and Mishara, A. L. (2017b). Is schizophrenia a disorder of
consciousness? experimental and phenomenological support for anomalous
unconscious processing. Front. Psychol. 8:1659. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01659
Goel, A., and Buonomano, D. V. (2016). Temporal interval learning in cortical
cultures is encoded in intrinsic network dynamics. Neuron 91, 320–327.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2016.05.042
Grober, E., and Buschke, H. (1987). Genuine memory deficits in dementia. Dev.
Neuropsychol. 3, 13–36. doi: 10.1080/87565648709540361
Haug, E., Lien, L., Raballo, A., Bratlien, U., Oie, M., Andreassen, O. A.,
et al. (2012a). Selective aggregation of selfdisorders in first-treatment DSM-
IV schizophrenia spectrum disorders. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 200, 632–636.
doi: 10.1097/NMD.0b013e31825bfd6f
Haug, E., Øie, M., Melle, I., Andreassen, O. A., and Raballo, A.,
Bratlien, U., et al. (2012b). The association between self-disorders and
neurocognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia. Schizophr. Res. 135, 79-83.
doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2011.11.015
Heinrichs, R. W., and Zakzanis, K. K. (1998). Neurocognitive deficit in
schizophrenia: a quantitative review of the evidence. Neuropsychology 12,
426–445.
Hur, J.-W., Kwon, J. S., Lee, T. Y., and Park, S. (2014). The crisis of minimal self-
awareness in schizophrenia: a meta-analytic review. Schizophr. Res. 152, 58-64.
doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2013.08.042
Los, S. A., and van den Heuvel, C. E. (2001). Intentional and unintentional
contributions to nonspecific preparation during reaction time
foreperiods. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 27, 370–386.
doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.27.2.370
Lysaker, P. H., and Lysaker, J. T. (2010). Schizophrenia and alterations in
self-experience: a comparison of 6 perspectives. Schizophr. Bull. 36, 331-40.
doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbn077
Martin, B., Wittmann, M., Franck, N., Cermolacce, M., Berna, F., and Giersch, A.
(2014). Temporal structure of consciousness andminimal self in schizophrenia.
Front. Psychol. 5:1175. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01175
Martin, B., Franck, N., Cermolacce, M., Falco, A., Benair, A., Etienne, E., et al.
(2017). Fragile temporal prediction in patients with schizophrenia is related to
minimal self disorders. Sci. Rep. 7:8278. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-07987-y
Mishara, A. L., Lysaker, P. H., and Schwartz, M. A. (2014). Self-disturbances in
schizophrenia: history, phenomenology, and relevant findings from research
on metacognition. Schizophr. Bull. 40, 5–12. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbt169
Møller, P., and Husby, R. (2000). The initial prodrome in schizophrenia: searching
for naturalistic core dimensions of experience and behavior. Schizophr. Bull. 26,
217–232.
Nelson, B., Thompson, A., Chanen, A. M., Amminger, G. P., and Yung,
A. R. (2013a). Is basic self-disturbance in ultra-high risk for psychosis
(“prodromal”) patients associated with borderline personality pathology? Early
Interv. Psychiatry 7, 306–310. doi: 10.1111/eip.12011
Nelson, B., Thompson, A., and Yung, A. R. (2013b). Not all first-episode
psychosis is the same: preliminary evidence of greater basic self-disturbance
in schizophrenia spectrum cases. Early Interv. Psychiatry 7, 200-204.
doi: 10.1111/j.1751-7893.2012.00381.x
Niemi, P., and Näätänen, R. (1981). Foreperiod and simple reaction time. Psychol.
Bull. 89, 133-162.
Nobre, A. C., and van Ede, F. (2018). Anticipated moments: temporal structure in
attention. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 19, 34–48. doi: 10.1038/nrn.2017.141
Nordgaard, J., Handest, P., Vollmer-Larsen, A., Sæbye, D., Pedersen, J. T., and
Parnas, J. (2017). Temporal persistence of anomalous self-experience: a 5years
follow-up. Schizophr. Res. 179, 36–40. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2016.10.001
Nordgaard, J., and Parnas, J. (2014). Self-disorders and schizophrenia spectrum:
a study of 100 first hospital admissions. Schizophr. Bull. 40, 1300–1307.
doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbt239
Parnas, J., Handest, P., Saebye, D., and Jansson, L. (2003). Anomalies of subjective
experience in schizophrenia and psychotic bipolar illness.Acta Psychiatr. Scand.
108, 126–133.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 April 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 132
Martin et al. Self and Timing in Schizophrenia
Parnas, J., Møller, P., Kircher, T., Thalbitzer, J., Jansson, L., Handest, P., et al.
(2005). EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience. Psychopathology 38,
236-258. doi: 10.1159/000088441
Raballo, A., Sæbye, D., and Parnas, J. (2011). Looking at the schizophrenia
spectrum through the prism of self-disorders: an empirical study. Schizophr.
Bull. 37, 344-351. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbp056
Roy, M., Grondin, S., and Roy, M. A. (2012). Time perception disorders are
related to working memory impairments in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res. 200,
159–166. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2012.06.008
Shallice, T., and Burgess, P. W. (1991). Deficits in strategy application following
frontal lobe damage in man. Brain 114, 727–741. doi: 10.1093/brain/114.2.727
Stanghellini, G. (2009). Embodiment and schizophrenia.World Psychiatry 8, 56-59.
Thoenes, S., and Oberfeld, D. (2017). Meta-analysis of time perception and
temporal processing in schizophrenia: differential effects on precision and
accuracy. Clin. Psychol. Rev. 54, 44–64. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2017.03.007
Tombaugh, T. N. (2004). Trail making test A and B: normative data
stratified by age and education. Arch. Clin. Neuropsychol. 19, 203–214.
doi: 10.1016/S0887-6177(03)00039-8
Vallesi, A., Arbula, S., and Bernardis, P. (2014). Functional dissociations in
temporal preparation: evidence from dual task performance. Cognition 130,
141–151. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.10.006
Vogeley, K., and Kupke, C. (2007). Disturbances of time consciousness from
a phenomenological and a neuroscientific perspective. Schizophr. Bull. 33,
157–165. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbl056
Ward, R. D., Kellendonk, C., Kandel, E. R., and Balsam, P. D. (2012). Timing as
a window on cognition in schizophrenia. Neuropharmacology 62, 1175–1181.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropharm.2011.04.014
Zahn, T. P., Rosenthal, D., and Shakow, D. (1963). Effects of irregular preparatory
intervals on reaction time in schizophrenia. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 67, 44–52.
doi: 10.1037/h0049269
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Martin, Franck, Cermolacce, Coull and Giersch. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2018 | Volume 12 | Article 132
